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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WILLIAM J. FARRELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE MENNEN COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, SMITH-FAUS DRUG COM-
pANY, a corporation, ZIONS CO-
OPERATIVE MERCANTILE IN-
. STITUTION, a corp~ration, W AL-
GREEN DRUG COMPANY, a corp-
oration, and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants and Respondent~. 
Case No. 
7461 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from a judgment (R. 9) of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, sustaining respondents' demurrer 
(R. 7) to the complaint (R. 1-6) as failing to state facts 
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sufficient to constitute a cause of action and dismissing the 
complaint. 
\ 
Respondents, Smith-Faus Drug Co., Zions Co-Operative 
Mercantile Institution and Walgreen Drug Company, are 
charged with infringment of an alleged trade name "Brace 
For the Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair," by selling a 
skin lotion under the mark "Skin Bracer." The complaint 
is b~sed upon the annexed "Exhibit A," a certified copy of 
a trade-mark registration (R. 6) issued to appellant on 
August 31, 1925, by the Secretary of State of Utah. That 
registration is for a complete label comprising the words 
"BRACE FOR THE HAIR" over the phrase "A Real 
Bracer For The Hair" in a distinctive design and with the 
further legend "Alcohol 15%. Formulated and Produced by 
WM. FARRELL, HAIR SPECIALIST, Salt Lake City, State 
of Utah." The registration further states "Said Trade 
Mark to be used generally as follows: A Real Bracer for the 
hair.'' 
We do not agree with the-statement in appellant's brief 
(pp. 6, 7) of the points and arguments presented in support 
of the demurrer. Such statement was stricken from the 
record by the District Court's order_ of February 25, 1950. 
All points were fully argued and submitted in memoranda 
below, and we do not agree with appellant's conclusion 
(brief pp. 7-8) : "Naturally, neither party knows which of 
the three arguments of respondents, if any, influenced the 
Court when it sustained the demurrer." 
It is perfectly clear to us why the Court sustained the 
demurrer and appellant's contention to the contrary can 
serve only to cloud the issues decided below. 
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STATEMENT OF POINT 
Respondents rely upon the following point for affirm-
ance of the judgment appealed from: 
1. The Complaint with annexed "Exhibit A" 
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant has not acquired exclusive rights in "Bracer." 
Respondents' demurrer admits the facts well pleaded 
but not, of course, their sufficiency. Here the facts pleaded 
clearly show that appellant has acquired no rights to the 
dictionary word "Bracer" by its use of the alleged trade-
mark "Brace For The Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair," 
the only use alleged. 
Appellant, throughout his brief, assumes his alleged 
use of the word "bracer" constitutes a trade-mark use. 
Such is not the fact under the allegations of his complaint. 
Appellant's alleged trade-mark is not the word "bracer" 
alone, as assumed in appellant's arguments, but is at the 
very least the combination of words "A Real Bracer For. 
The Hair." As the word "bracer" is used by appellant, in 
that phrase, it is incapable of acquiring any trade-mark 
significance. This proposition rests upon the obviously 
sound principle that when a word is used, not in a trade-
mark sense as the badge of the sponsor but only in a sense 
which is laudatory advertising of the product, it cannot 
become the exclusive mark of anyone who so uses it. We 
cite a few of the leading authorities applying this principle. 
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In Burmel Handkerchief Corp. v. Cluett Peabody & Co., 
(CCPA) 127 F. 2d 318, at page 321, involving the slogan 
"Handkerchief of the Year," the court stated: 
"In the final analysis such expressions as we 
are discussing with relation to objects of trade are 
a 'puffing of wares' and are intended to call at-
tention to the superiority of the advertised goods. 
Such expressions are a condensed form of describ-
ing in detail the outstanding character or quality of 
the objects to which they are applied * * * 
"* * * We are further of opinion that the 
notation inherently cannot function as a trade-mark. 
Such a common expression which can indicate noth-
ing but high quality surely would not be indicative 
of origin to the purchasing public." 
In Rosenberg v. Shakeproof (D. C., Del.), 20 F. Supp. 
959, it was held that the word "Self-Tapping", as there 
used by the plaintiff in its label, was incapable of acquiring 
trade-mark significance. The label is reproduced at p. 963 
and includes, as here, the na~e of the maker of the goods. 
The court stated ( pp. 963-4) : 
"The inconspicuous words 'hardened,' 'self-tap-
ping,' and 'sheet metal screws' are descriptive of the 
character, operation, and purpose of the product. 
Plaintiff's advertising matter in evidence contains 
many statements emphasizing the descriptive sense 
in which the plaintiffs have been using the word 
'self-tapping.' The way in which plaintiffs have 
used the word 'self-tapping' precludes all possibility 
that the word has come to indicate to anyone the 
origin of the product. It is likewise established by 
the evidence that the word 'self-tapping' has never 
been used by the defendant in any other sense than 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
in a descriptive sense. It is clear that the word 
'self-tapping' cannot be appropriated by plaintiffs 
as a valid trade-mark." 
In the present case, the descriptive sense in which ap-
pellant has used the word "bracer" is "emphasized" in the 
phrase "A Real Bracer For The Hair." 
In Ex pa.rte American Enka Corp., a Commissioner's 
Decision in June, 1949, 81 U. S. P. Q. 476, the facts were 
stated as follows (p. 476) : 
"The mark sought to be registered consists of a 
vertical gray rectangle having a large black circle 
superimposed upon the center thereof. Above the 
circle appear the words 'THE FATE OF A FABRIC 
HANGS BY A THREAD,' and below it appear the 
words 'ENKA Rayon.' Within the circle appears 
the words 'Fashion APPROVED.'" 
The similarity to appellant's label and alleged trade-
mark is apparent. In holding this mark, and particularly 
the slogan, "THE FATE OF A FABRIC HANGS BY A 
THREAD" incapable of trade-mark significance, the opin-
ion states ( pp. 4 77-4 78) : 
"The phrase 'THE FATE OF A FABRIC 
HANGS BY A THREAD' as presented and used ap-
pears to me obviously to be an advertising phrase 
indicating that the success or failure of a fabric de-
pends upon the thread of which it is made and, as 
associated with other features of the mark presented, 
is clearly a laudatory or puffing expression indicat-
ing that the use of 'ENKA' thread in a fabric is de-
sirable to insure against an unhappy fate. It would 
appear that any function or identification in the 
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mark presented results from the use of the name 
'ENKA' in the label, and that, unless used with that 
word or with applicant's name, or otherwise associ-
ated with some other indication of a source or origin 
of the thread, the phrase in question would not serve 
as a means of identification of origin. As such it 
would not appear to distinguish the goods of appli-
cant from the goods of others, and whether or not 
used in connection with 'ENKA' would simply stand .... 
as, and be recognized as, a truism, perhaps aptly 
stated, indicating the desirability that fabric be 
composed of good thread. Alone it would not dis-
tinguish or identify any particular thread and would 
seem merely an advertisement or advertising phrase 
with reference to a potential use of thread, the 
origin of which must be otherwise determined. While 
not controlling and perhaps amounting to an over-
simplification, it seems extremely doubtful that any-
one would order or call for 'THE FATE OF A 
FABRIC HANGS BY A THREAD' thread." 
* * * * * 
"While, as indicate.d above, it has never been 
questioned but that a plurality of words might func-
tion as a trade mark, it must be noted that both 
historically and by common understanding, overlong 
phrases, sentences or clauses describing goods have 
been regarded as advertisements rather than trade 
marks. Somewhere between the few words ordinar-
ily included in a trade mark and the number of words 
included in a historical novel a line must be drawn. 
Mer~ advertising language or features even if at-
tached to ~oods or their containers, cannot be con-
sidered to be trade marks since they are or would 
be just as applicable to the similar products of any 
manufacturer and therefore cannot serve to identify 
the goods of one person or distinguish from those of 
others.· 
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"Accepting, therefore, applicant's contention 
that the question is not whether or not his mark is a 
slogan, but whether or not it is a trade mark, it 
must be found that the examiner was correct in 
finding that words do not function as a trade mark 
and cannot serve to indicate source or origin or 
identify the goods of one applicant and distinguish 
them from those of others." 
Appellant's alleged use of "bracer" is merely in a lauda-
tory phrase. 
The function of a trade-mark is to indicate the origin 
of goods, and not merely to state their function or puff 
their merits. As stated by Nims in "Unfair Competition 
and Trade-Marks," Vol. 1, at page 520: 
"The important question of fact to be determin-
ed is whether the trade-mark name indicates the 
producer, not whether it indicates the nature of the 
goods. It may do both but it must, as its primary 
function, indicate the producer."-
Since appellant has long used the word "bracer" in a 
purely descriptive and laudatory sense, by combining it 
with all the other words in the label, and at least with "A 
Real Bracer For The Hair", he can not now prevent others 
using the word "bracer" either to show that their hair 
preparations have the same qualities for bracing the hair 
or for any other purpose. It follows that any seller of skin 
lotions is free to claim that his product is a "bracer" for 
the skin so far as appellant is concerned. Such use of the 
word "bracer" merely puffs the quality of his product and 
has no significance as to origin in appellant. Therefore, 
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respondents' use of "bracer" alone or with "skin" cannot 
possibly confuse appellant's product with respondents' pro-
duct. 
We emphasize the respondents' position is based upon 
the particular modus in which "bracer" is and has been for 
25 years used by appellant, as part of the phrase "A Real 
Bracer For The Hair," because appellant's arguments 
ignore this point. In commenting on an exception to the 
general r.ule that a word, generic or descriptive of the pro-
duct, cannot be appropriated exclusively, appellant assumes 
that his alleged trade-mark is simply the word "bracer" and 
proceeds to cite authorities to show that such a word may 
become a valid trade-mark when through long and exclusive 
use as a trade name or mark it has acquired a secondary 
meaning, indicating to the public the source of the product. 
We do not dispute this exception to the general rule. Re-
spondents did not below, and do not now contend that if' 
appellant had used the word "bracer" by itself, in a trade-
mark sense to denote the source rather than some claim of 
functional merit of the product, it could not have acquired 
a secondary meaning and thus become valid as a trade-mark 
or trade-name. But appellant elected to use "bracer" in a 
phrase and in such a manner that on the face of his alleged 
trade-mark "A Real Bracer For The Hair" the word "brac-
er" has only a descriptive meaning. Therein lies the basic 
distinction between the present case and those relied upon 
by appellant. 
It also is beside the point to contend, as appellant does, 
that the word "bracer" has become obsolete in the sense of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
denoting a ''tonic" or "stimulant" 1 and is therefore, not 
currently descriptive of appellant's hair preparation. Ob-
viously, to characterize appellant's hair tonic as "A Real 
Bracer For The Hair" makes use of the word "bracer" 
descriptively, whether in the tonic or stimulant sense or in 
the sense of that which "binds or makes firm," "strengthens, 
steadies," which is equally applicable to a hair preparation 
and is admittedly a current sense according to definitions 
in appellant's brief (pp. 11-12). Appellant has chosen to 
use this word in a descriptive sense, because otherwise his 
advertising phrltse would have no meaning or would be 
deceptive. Having regard to this manner in which "bracer" 
I 
appears as a part of appellant's alleged trade-mark, it is 
curious to find appellant suggesting (Brief p. 13) that a 
customer would be referred to the State Liquor Store if he 
asked for a "bracer." It would seem more appropriate to 
consider whether the floor walker would have directed the 
customer to the liquor store if he had asked for "a real 
bracer for the hair." 
The L'Origan case is not in point. 
Since appellant's brief makes repeated reference to 
LeBlume Import Co. v. Coty, 293 Fed. 344, we point out 
that in that case the trade-mark "L'Origan" had been used 
by itself and not as part of a composite mark or laudatory 
1The following standard dictionaries show that the use of "bracer" in 
this sense is not obsolete: Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 3rd Edition 
of Merriam Series, 1929; Webster's Universities Dictionary, World 
Publishing Co., 1940; The New Century DictiQnary, The Century Co., 
1929; Everyman's English Dictionary, E. P. Dutton, 1926; Macmillan's 
Modern Dictionary, Macmillan Co., 1943; Wyld-Universal Dictionary 
of English Language, G. Rautledge & Sons, 1932. 
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phrase which showed on its face that the word "origan" 
had only a descriptive meaning. The trade-mark owner had 
used the word in a trade-mark sense, so that it was at least 
capable of acquiring a secondary meaning, whether or not 
it was obsolete. Moreover, it appeared that the trade-mark 
owner had originated the te~ as applied in a trade-mark 
sense to perfume. In distinguishing the case, the court in 
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Compo Shoe Machinery 
Corp., (C. C. P. A.), 56 F. 2d 292, stated (p. 294): 
"The controlling facts of the case at bar are 
very different from those in the case of LeBlume 
Import Co. v. Coty (C. C. A.) 293 F. 344 (chiefly 
relied upon by appellee), where the word 'Lorigan' 
was held to be registerable as a trade-mark for 
perfume. 'Lorigan' and 'Origan' meant the same. 
'Origan' was the name of a rare plant. The prin-
cipal base. of Coty's perfume was not the essence 
from the origan plant, although it was claimed to 
be the principal basis of other perfumes. The 
court pointed out the equities of Coty who, un-
like the appellee in the case at bar, was the origin-
ator of the term as applied to perfume, and also 
called attention to the suggestive rather than de-
scriptive character of the term, and applied the 
doctrine of secondary meaning. 
* * * * * 
"One of appellee's witnesses claimed to have 
'originated' the term 'Compo.' Upon this record it 
can hardly be said that he 'originated' it; at most he 
only brought it into more extensive use. If appel-
lee's position in this case is correct, a manufacturer 
of women's wearing apparel could 'originate' the 
term 'bustle' and get a monopoly upon the term, 
since bustles, as far as we know, are no longer used 
and have not been in use nor have they been often 
referred to in literature or conversation during the 
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greater portion of the last half century. If appel-
lee's contentions with respect to a trade-mark right 
in the word which it claims to be obsolete were ap-
proved by the courts, the problems of the Patent 
Office and the courts in determining what words 
were 'obsolete and forgotten' would increase in fre-
quency and perplexity. A trade-mark, as was held 
by the United States Supreme Court in Bourjois 
& Co. v. Katzel, 260 U. S. 689, 692, 43 S. Ct. 244, 67 
L. Ed. 464, 26 A. L. R. 567, carries with it a mon-
opoly, as far as it goes, no less complete than does 
a patent. Such monopolistic rights must rest on 
foundations more secure than those upon which ap-
pellee relies." 
In sum, appellant does not allege that "Bracer" is 
original with him, or even a trade-mark use of that. well-
known word. 
Registration created no substantive rights in appellant. 
Apparently ~ppellant does not now contend that his 
registration in 1925 under the statute quoted (brief p. 27) 
was more than a mere "record" of "his claim," as stated in 
the Utah statutes to the present time. His reliance on the 
statutes is merely for constructive notice of that purported 
claim. 
It is the universal rule that registration statutes are 
merely in affirmance of the common law and do not create 
or confer any substantive rights in trade-marks registered 
thereunder, see generally, 52 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 
44, p. 534, and 63 Corpus Juris, Sec. 142, p. 470, Trade-
.tlark Cases 100 U. S. 82, and Armstrong Paint & Varnish 
Works vs. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
"Skin Bracer" or "Bracer" on skin lotion is not an in-
fringement of appellant's compoBite mark. 
Assuming, however erroneously, that "Brace For The 
Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair" is capable of being or 
becoming a valid trade-mark for hair tonic, it is clearly not 
infringed by respondents' use of "bracer" alone or with 
the word "skin" for the well-known and long-established 
Mennen product. 
As pointed out by Nims In "Unfair Competition and 
Trade-Marks, (4th Ed.) Vol. 1, p. 361: 
"The cardinal rule upon the subject is that no 
one shall, by imitation or any unfair device, induce 
the public to believe that the goods he offers for 
sale are the goods of another and thereby appropri-
ate. to himself the value of the reputation which the 
other has acquired for his own products or merchan ... 
dise." 
There follows a collection of representative cases where 
infringement of various labels, slogans and trade ... marks was 
decided. In none was relief granted where there was as 
little likelihood of confusion as is here the case, and in many 
where the respective marks were much closer was relief 
denied. 
Respondents use only "bracer," one of the ten words 
in appellant's composite mark or phrase. Could the public 
possibly be "induced" thereby to believe that Mennen's 
"Skin Bracer" was the product of William Farrell-Hair 
·Specialist? A member of the public in Utah, buying the 
widely-known "Skin Bracer" lotion, even if he had great 
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familiarity with only part of appellant's phrase "A Real 
Bracer For The Hair," would not associate the lotion of 
Mennen with the tonic of Farrell or with Farrell himself. 
Something more than the one common word "bracer" would 
be necessary for such association. If appellant wanted the 
public, via his phrase, to associate a skin lotion with him or 
his tonic, he would undoubtedly use the full phrase, sub-
stituting "skin" for "hair." The mere use of "bracer" 
would obviously not be enough to insure this desired public 
association. 
Actually "Skin Bracer'' and "Brace For The Hair, A 
Real Bracer For The Hair" are so different in sound, mean-
ing and appearance there is no infringement of one by the 
other. 
Even if appellant had been right as to validity and in-
fringement the Complaint is still fatally defective. 
It is interesting to note that, while the complaint, para. 
7 (R. 3), alleges that "Skin Bracer" has been used by Men-
nen and by respondents "for sometime last past," it fails to 
allege that appellant adopted or used his alleged trade-mark 
prior to respondents or to Mennen. This seems a fatal omis-
sion to a cause of action for trade-mark infringement and 
for the injunctive relief prayed for by appellant (R. 4) be-
cause priority of adoption and use is necessary to appel-
lant's affirmative case. Under the statute, Utah Code An-
notated 1943, Sec. 95-1-6, it is the "person who has first 
adopted and used a trade-mark, trade-name or device" who 
is the "owner" and entitled to an injunction and damages 
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for its infringement. The same is true at common law, Nims 
(supra). Sec. 217, pp. 628-9. 
The District Court did not err in entering the judgment 
from which appellant appeals. 
Appellant as an afterthought, (brief pp. 29-30), con-
tends that because the District Court did not have or obtain 
jurisdiction over The Mennen Company and an unidentified 
other party defendant, John Doe, it should not have dis-
missed the complaint as to them, but only as to the three 
respondents w~o alone demurred. 
This seems extremely technical when it is considered 
that appellant elected to stand on his complaint because he 
has alleged all facts that he can prove, (brief p. 8), and the 
complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action against The Mennen Company and the unidenti-
fied defendant for the same reasons that it was held in-
sufficient by the Court below as against the respondents. 
One attempted service on The Mennen Compa·ny in New 
Jersey has already ~een vacated below on Mennen's motion 
because as stated by appellant, (brief p. 29), the District 
Court had no jurisdiction over The Mennen Company and 
John Doe. What useful purpose could be accomplished by 
appellant hereafter obtaining a valid service on defendants 
over which the Court now has no jurisdiction, if the com-
plaint upon which service is issued alleges all that can be 
proved but does not state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted against such defendants. 
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We submit, however, that the judgment entered by the 
District Court, in substance and legal effect, dismisses this 
action as to the respondents only. If, in view of appellant's 
contentions there should be any doubt in this respect, this 
Court, of course, may clarify the legal effect of the District 
Court's judgment by a simple modification thereof to the 
effect that the action herein is dismissed only as to the 
respondents, Smith-Faus Drug Company, Zions Co-opera-
tive Mercantile Institution and Walgreen Drug Company, 
and as so modified, affirm the same. 
CONCLUSION 
So it appears that the District Court had clear reason 
to sustain the demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. 
It could serve no useful purpose to put respondents to the 
trouble and expense of trial on such a complaint. 
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with 
costs to respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON, 
Attorneys for Respondents·. 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Of Counsel 
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New York, New York 
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